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Abstract
This paper studies expert advice when an influence-hungry expert derives an intrinsic
benefit from influencing a client’s decision. A consulting paradox arises: the more the
client needs advice, the less accurate is expert advice. The reason is that the expert’s
benefit from influence engenders an incentive to misreport information which is positively
related to the client’s need of advice. This paradox advances the debate on consulting
beyond its focus on commissions and provides a new explanation to experts’ misreporting
of information. Finally, the consulting paradox sheds light on the challenges posed by
influence-hungry experts to client protection authorities and the consulting industry.
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1 Introduction
In consulting experts guide clients’ decisions through advice. When agency conflicts or
private benefits are absent, expert advice enables clients to make informed decisions.
For this reason, expert advice is ubiquitous in policy-making, business management and
finance.
Yet experimental evidence suggests that experts may be influence-hungry : they may
derive an intrinsic benefit from influencing clients’ decisions. Schaerer et al. (2018) find
that advice giving enhances individuals’ sense of power because of influence over others’
decisions. This intrinsic benefit from influence is proportional to actual influence over
others’ decisions. Furthermore, individuals who exhibit a stronger desire to influence
others’ decisions are more inclined to give advice. Experts may hence derive an intrinsic
benefit from influencing clients’ decisions when they advise clients.
This paper studies expert advice when experts are influence-hungry. In my model
an expert knows the state of the world and advises a client who then chooses an action.
The expert is influence-hungry: he benefits from inducing a client’s action which deviates
from the action that the client would take without advice. Moreover, the expert cares
that the client takes a suitable action, because of liability or reputation concerns.
The main result is the emergence of a consulting paradox. The more the client needs
advice, the less accurate is expert advice. Since the expert benefits from influencing the
client’s decision, if the expert correctly reports the state, the action that he would expect
the client to take is too moderate from his perspective.1 The expert has hence an incentive
to exaggerate the state in that when the state differs from the client’s action without
advice, the expert wants to convince the client that the state differs even more. The
1The action is too moderate in the sense that it is too similar to the client’s action without advice.
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expert’s incentive to exaggerate induces less accurate advice. Furthermore, the expert’s
incentive to exaggerate and the client’s need of advice strengthen with the difference
between the state and the client’s action without advice. Thus, the higher is the client’s
need of advice, the less accurate is expert advice.
This finding advances the debate on consulting beyond its focus on expert commis-
sions. Commission gains bias expert advice (Jackson 2005, Inderst and Ottaviani 2009,
2012, and Inderst 2015). However, many experts such as policymakers’ advisers and in-
house analysts are not remunerated through commissions. Besides, experts may derive an
intrinsic benefit from influence even in presence of commissions. The consulting paradox
provides a behavioral explanation to experts’ misreporting of information that abstracts
from commissions: experts are influence-hungry.
The consulting paradox further demonstrates that influence-hungry experts pose a
challenge to client protection authorities and the consulting industry in general. Indeed,
influence-hungry experts are especially harmful to clients since the stronger is the clients’
need of advice, the less accurate is expert advice. Moreover, the experts’ intrinsic benefit
from influence is not directly observable by regulators. The design of regulations that
mitigate its impact on expert advice could hence be complicated, though possible in
principle.
In line with the cheap talk literature initiated by Crawford and Sobel (1982), ex-
pert advice is the least accurate when the expert’s taste to influence becomes extreme.
Specifically, the expert only reports whether the state is to the “left” or to the “right” of
the client’s action without advice since for any state the expert wants to exert maximal
influence over the client’s decision. In this limit case the consulting paradox ceases to
exist. Expert advice is the least accurate for any state and is hence independent from
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the client’s need of advice.
Besides being important for understanding expert advice, this paper complements a
number of other studies on preferences for power. McClelland (1975) argues that power
is a basic human need motivating individuals’ actions. Experimental research detects
preferences for power in decision making and advice. Bartling, Fehr and Herz (2014)
find that for many individuals, decision making carries an intrinsic value beyond its
instrumental benefit for achieving certain outcomes. As a result, individuals prefer to
make decisions rather than to delegate decision making even when delegation is more
profitable (Fehr, Herz and Wilkening, 2013). Similarly, Owens, Grossman and Fackler
(2014) show that individuals prefer to retain control over decisions. Schaerer et al. (2018)
find that advice giving engenders an intrinsic benefit from influence over others’ decisions.
Building on these findings, current theoretical studies investigate the implications of
preferences for power. Dessein and Holden (2019) analyze hierarchies in organizations
where power-hungry managers derive an intrinsic benefit from making decisions. Instead,
I aim at shedding light on expert advice when influence-hungry experts derive an intrinsic
benefit from influencing clients’ decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section
3 characterizes equilibria. Section 4 illustrates the consulting paradox. Section 5 studies
expert advice with extreme taste to influence. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the
Appendix.
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2 Model
To model expert advice, we consider a framework of strategic communication between an
expert (E henceforth) and a client (C henceforth).
2.1 Information
The expert privately observes the realization of a state x ∈ [−1/2, 1/2]. It is common
knowledge that x is uniformly distributed on [−1/2, 1/2].
2.2 Preferences
The client chooses action y ∈ [−1/2, 1/2] to maximize the expectation of her utility
UC(y, x) = −(y − x)2. (1)
We see from (1) that the client wants her action to match the state. The −(y − x)2
term captures the client’s loss from not matching the state.2 Without advice, the client
chooses yˆ = E(x) = 0.
The expert advises the client on the state. Expert’s utility is
UE (y(m), x;κ) = −(y(m)− x)2 + κ (y(m)− yˆ)2 . (2)
The expert has two objectives. On the one hand, the expert wants the client to take
a suitable action. An unsuitable action may cause a reputation loss or a punishment by a
regulatory authority. On the other hand, the expert is influence-hungry. He intrinsically
benefits from inducing a client’s action which deviates from the client’s action without
advice. This benefit from influence increases the more the client’s action differs from the
2The quadratic utility functions and the uniform distribution of x are assumptions commonly used
in the literature for the sake of tractability.
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client’s action without advice.3 The −(y(m)−x)2 term captures the expert’s concern for
suitability, κ ∈ (0, 1) is the expert’s taste to influence, and κ(y(m) − yˆ)2 represents the
expert’s benefit from influence. The expert chooses message m ∈ [−1/2, 1/2] to maximize
his utility.
2.3 Timing
Figure 1 summarizes the model. First, the expert privately observes the state. Second,
the expert advises the client. Third, the client updates beliefs. Finally, the client chooses
the action.
𝑡1 𝑡2 𝑡3 𝑡4
Expert 
observes
state x
Expert 
gives
advice m
Client 
updates
belief on x
Client 
chooses
action y
Figure 1: Timeline
All aspects of the model except the state are common knowledge. Since we aim at
studying advice of an influence-hungry expert, our framework of strategic communication
is intentionally standard. The key novelty is the modeling of the expert’s intrinsic benefit
from influencing the client’s decision. To solve the model we look for perfect Bayesian
equilibria.
3This feature captures the experimental finding of Schaerer et al. (2018) that individuals’ intrinsic
benefit from influence is proportional to actual influence over others’ actions.
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2.4 Client’s Decision
To investigate incentives at work in expert advice and then characterize equilibria, it is
useful to first consider the client’s decision. The client chooses action y solving
max
y
E (UC |m) = E
[−(y − x)2|m]
= − [y − E(x|m)]2 − V ar(x|m) (3)
where E(x|m) and V ar(x|m) are the expectation and the variance of the state conditional
on expert advice. The client’s optimal action is
y∗(m) = E(x|m). (4)
2.5 Incentives to Misreport Information
We can now study expert’s incentives to report state x to the client. For this purpose,
we compare expert’s and client’s desired actions.
The expert’s desired action maximizing (2) is
yE =
x
1− κ. (5)
If the client knew state x, (4) implies that her desired action would be
yC = x. (6)
We see from (5) and (6) that yE < yC when x < 0, yE = yC when x = 0, and
yE > yC when x > 0. Since the expert benefits from influencing the client’s decision, if
the expert correctly reports the state, the action that he would expect the client to take
is too moderate from his perspective. The expert has hence an incentive to exaggerate
the state: when the state differs from the client’s action without advice, the expert
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wants to convince the client that the state differs even more. For this reason, the expert
exaggerates the state by reporting m < x if x < 0 and m > x if x > 0. We can measure
the expert’s incentive to exaggerate as the absolute difference between the expert’s and
the client’s desired action, that is,
|yE − yC | = κ
1− κ |x| . (7)
We see from (7) that the expert’s incentive to exaggerate is symmetric around the
client’s action without advice. Moreover, the expert’s incentive to exaggerate strengthens
the more the state deviates from the client’s action without advice. Finally, the expert’s
incentive to exaggerate increases with the expert’s taste to influence.
3 Equilibrium
The model has a multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria. Each equilibrium partitions
[−1/2, 1/2] into intervals. The expert communicates in which interval state x is in. The
expert’s incentive to exaggerate determines the size of intervals, that is, how accurate is
expert advice.
Formally, an equilibrium is defined by (i) the expert’s advice strategy, (ii) the client’s
strategy after advice, (iii) the client’s belief on the state after advice. The expert’s advice
strategy defines probability p(m|x) of giving advice m if the expert observes x. The
client’s strategy after expert advice m is y∗(m). Client’s belief on the state after expert
advice µ(x|m) is the probability of x given advice m.
Perfect Bayesian equilibria require that (a) the expert’s advice strategy is optimal for
the expert given client’s strategy, (b) the client’s strategy is optimal given the client’s
belief on the state after advice, (c) the client’s belief on the state after advice is derived
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from the expert’s advice strategy using Bayes’s rule whenever possible.
Since perfect Baysian equilibria partition the state space into intervals, we denote
(a0, a1, .., ai−1, ai, ai+1, .., aN) the partition points of [−1/2, 1/2] into N intervals with
a0 = −1/2, aN = 1/2 and ai < ai+1 for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, .., N − 1}.
Our first result characterizes equilibria.
Proposition 1 (Equilibria) For every positive integer N , there exists at least one equi-
librium (p(m|x), y∗(m), µ(x|m)), where
(i) p(m|x) is uniform, supported on [ai−1, ai] if x ∈ (ai−1, ai);
(ii) µ(x|m) is uniform, supported on [ai−1, ai] if m ∈ (ai−1, ai);
(iii) ai+1 − ai = ai − ai−1 + 4κ1−κai for i ∈ {1, 2, .., N − 1} with a0 = −1/2 and aN = 1/2;
(iv) y∗(m) = ai−1+ai
2
for all m ∈ (ai−1, ai).
Moreover,
(v) In each equilibrium intervals are symmetric around zero;
(vi) The number of intervals in an equilibrium can be infinite.
All other equilibria are economically equivalent.
Figure 2 illustrates equilibria. In each equilibrium, the expert communicates in which
interval is the state. The second-order difference equation in (iii) defines the size of
intervals. The size of an interval (ai+1 − ai) is the size of the preceding interval (ai − ai−1)
plus 4κ
1−κai. The expert’s incentive to exaggerate the state determines how information is
distorted. Specifically, the expert’s incentive to exaggerate induces less accurate advice
(larger intervals). Since the expert’s incentive to exaggerate increases the more the state
differs from the client’s action without advice and in the expert’s taste to influence, so
does the size of intervals. Thus, expert advice becomes less accurate, the larger is the
difference between the state and the client’s action without advice as well as the stronger
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is the expert’s taste to influence.
Intervals are symmetric around zero because the expert’s incentive to exaggerate is
symmetric around the client’s action without advice. The equilibrium number of intervals
can be infinite since the expert has an incentive to exaggerate for any state except zero.
2Na 1Na Na2a1a0a
02/1 2/1

Figure 2: Equilibria
4 Consulting Paradox
In this section we investigate the relationship between the client’s need of advice and
accuracy of expert advice. We measure the client’s need of advice as the difference in
client’s utility between her action when she is perfectly informed yC = x and her action
without advice yˆ = 0. For any state x, the client’s need of advice is
A(x) ≡ UC(yC , x)− UC(yˆ, x) = x2. (8)
We see from (8) that the more the state deviates from the client’s action without
advice, the more the client needs advice. The next result uncovers the relationship
between the client’s need of advice and accuracy of expert advice.
Proposition 2 (Consulting Paradox) The more the client needs advice, the less ac-
curate is expert advice.
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Proposition 2 shows that a consulting paradox emerges when the expert is influence-
hungry. The stronger is the client’s need of advice, the less accurate is expert advice.
The intuition is as follows. Both the client’s need of advice and the expert’s incentive to
exaggerate increase with the difference between the state and the client’s action without
advice.4 Furthermore, the expert’s incentive to exaggerate induces less accurate expert
advice. Thus, the more the state differs from the client’s action without advice, the larger
is the client’s need of advice and the less accurate is expert advice.
This finding advances the debate on consulting beyond its focus on expert commis-
sions (Jackson 2005, Inderst and Ottaviani 2009, 2012, and Inderst 2015). In particular,
the consulting paradox provides a new explanation to the experts’ misreporting of infor-
mation: experts are influence-hungry.
The consulting paradox further demonstrates that influence-hungry experts pose a
challenge to client protection authorities and the consulting industry. This is the case
because the experts’ intrinsic benefit from influence distorts experts’ incentives to report
information in an especially damaging manner for clients. Indeed, the stronger is the
clients’ need of advice, the less accurate is expert advice.
Moreover, the consulting paradox may prove difficult to address from a regulatory
perspective. The paradox stems from the experts’ intrinsic benefit from influence. Unlike
commissions, the experts’ intrinsic benefit from influence is not directly observable by
regulatory authorities. Designing regulations that mitigate its impact on expert advice
could hence be harder than for commissions, though theoretically possible.
4The expert’s incentive to exaggerate and the client’s need of advice are positively related. In-
deed, using (7), (8) and the fact that
√
x2 = |x|, we can express the expert’s incentive to ex-
aggerate as |yE − yC | = κ1−κ
√
A(x). Alternatively, we can express the client’s need of advice as
A(x) =
(
1−κ
κ |yE − yC |
)2
.
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5 Extreme Taste to Influence
We conclude our analysis by studying expert advice when the expert’s taste to influence is
extreme (κ→ 1). The next result shows that expert’s extreme taste to influence induces
binary advice.
Proposition 3 (Extreme Taste to Influence) When the expert’s taste to influence
becomes extreme, expert advice is binary.
When the expert’s taste to influence becomes extreme, the expert reports any state
in the least accurate manner to exert maximal influence over the client’s decision. Thus,
the expert only reports whether the state is in [−1/2, 0) or in [0, 1/2]. Expert advice is
hence binary.
This result is in line with the cheap talk literature initiated by Crawford and Sobel
(1982). In particular, the emergence of binary advice when the expert’s taste to influ-
ence becomes extreme is reminiscent of Kawamura (2015). In Kawamura’s model binary
communication is the only way to transmit private information for a sender who suffers
from severe overconfidence or underconfidence about his ability to correctly observe the
state.
The consulting paradox ceases to exist when the expert’s taste to influence is extreme.
In this limit case expert advice is the least accurate for any state and is hence independent
from the client’s need of advice.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes expert advice when an expert is influence-hungry. The main finding
is the emergence of a consulting paradox. The more the client needs advice, the less
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accurate is expert advice. This result advances the debate on consulting beyond its focus
on commissions. In particular, the consulting paradox provides a new explanation to
experts’ misreporting of information: experts derive an intrinsic benefit from influencing
clients’ decisions.
The consulting paradox further shows that influence-hungry experts pose a challenge
to client protection authorities and the consulting industry. Indeed, influence-hungry
experts are especially harmful to clients because the stronger is the clients’ need of advice,
the less accurate is expert advice. Moreover, the experts’ intrinsic benefit from influence
is not directly observable by regulators. The design of regulations that mitigate its impact
on expert advice could hence be complicated, though possible in principle.
Besides being highly relevant for the consulting industry and regulators, the findings
of this paper more generally inform the debate on the role of preferences for power in
decision making and advice. To my knowledge, my analysis is the first to study the impact
of experts’ intrinsic benefit from influence on expert advice. This novel perspective on
expert advice opens new avenues for research on consulting and preferences for power.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: To prove existence of perfect Bayesian equilibria, let xA
be the state such that the expert’s and the client’s desired actions coincide, that is,
yE(xA) = yC(xA). From (5) and (6) we have xA = 0. (5) and (6) also imply that
the expert’s desired action for any state x 6= 0 is larger than that of the client, that
is, yE(x) > yC(x) for x > 0 and yE(x) < yC(x) for x < 0. Furthermore, (5) and (6)
imply that the expert’s preference is continuous in y and the client’s desired decision
is continuous in x. We can therefore use Theorem 4 of Gordon (2010) to determine
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that there exists an equilibrium with an infinite number of intervals (hence (vi) is true).
Existence then follows from Theorem 2 of Gordon (2010) which shows that if there is
an infinite equilibrium, then there is an equilibrium with N intervals for every positive
integer N .
To characterize perfect Bayesian equilibria, let a and a¯ be two points in [−1/2, 1/2]
with a < a¯. Suppose the expert communicates x ∈ (a, a¯). Since x is uniformly distributed,
the client’s beliefs become
E [x|x ∈ (a, a¯)] = a+ a¯
2
. (A.1)
Then, from (4) the client’s action after advice is
y∗ (a, a¯) =
a+ a¯
2
. (A.2)
For equilibria to be truthful, the expert observing a state in (ai−1, ai) must prefer to
communicate such interval rather than the interval (ai, ai+1). This is the case when
an expert observing x = ai is indifferent between reporting the two intervals, that is,
UE(y
∗(ai−1, ai), ai, κ) = UE(y∗(ai, ai+1), ai, κ), or, using (2) and (A.2)
−
(
ai−1 + ai
2
− ai
)2
+ κ
(
ai−1 + ai
2
)2
= −
(
ai + ai+1
2
− ai
)2
+ κ
(
ai + ai+1
2
)2
⇔ ai+1 − 2(1 + κ)
1− κ ai + ai−1 = 0. (A.3)
This second-order difference equation defines the unique equilibrium partition for given
κ and N where
a0 = −1/2; aN = 1/2 (A.4)
and ai < ai+1 for all i ∈ {0, 1, 2, .., N − 1}. Subtracting ai from both sides of (A.3) we
can characterize equilibria as in (iii). These results also prove (i), (ii), and (iv).
Using (A.3) and boundary conditions (A.4), the solution of the second-order difference
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equation is
ai =
1
2 (zN1 − zN2 )
[(
1 + zN2
)
zi1 −
(
1 + zN1
)
zi2
]
for all i ∈ {0, 1, 2, .., N} (A.5)
where the distinct roots of the second-order difference equation are
z1 =
1 + κ+ 2
√
κ
1− κ (A.6)
z2 =
1 + κ− 2√κ
1− κ (A.7)
and satisfy z1z2 = 1 with z1 > 1.
(v) It is readily seen from (A.5) that for any integer 0 ≤ K ≤ N , aK = −aN−K , that is,
intervals are symmetrically distributed around zero.
Proof of Proposition 2: Since A(x) = x2 and x ∈ [−1/2, 1/2], the client’s need
of advice is zero when x = 0 and is strictly increasing as x moves away from zero.
The result then follows from Proposition 1 (iii) which shows that accuracy of expert
advice is monotonically decreasing (and locally strictly decreasing at partition points
i ∈ {1, 2, .., N − 1}) as x moves away from zero.
Proof of Proposition 3: We want to show that the most informative equilibrium with
N →∞ converges to the binary partition when κ→ 1. From (A.5) we have
ai =
1 + zN2
2 (zN1 − zN2 )
zi1 −
1 + zN1
2 (zN1 − zN2 )
zi2 for all i ∈ {0, 1, 2, .., N} (A.8)
and equivalently with a′0 = 1/2 and a
′
N = −1/2
a′i = −
1 + zN2
2 (zN1 − zN2 )
zi1 +
1 + zN1
2 (zN1 − zN2 )
zi2 for all i ∈ {0, 1, 2, .., N} (A.9)
where z1 and z2 are given by (A.6) and (A.7), respectively. Solving (A.8) and (A.9) for
N →∞ we obtain two sequences
ai = −zi2/2 for ai ∈ [−1/2, 0)
a′i = z
i
2/2 for a
′
i ∈ (0, 1/2] such that a′0 = 1/2
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Since z2 → 0 when κ→ 1, both sequences converge to 0. The most informative equilib-
rium therefore converges to the binary equilibrium. Thus, the binary equilibrium is the
only informative equilibrium.
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